SKU-11 · 130 nm CMOS (SKY130) SOH-aware BMS controller
SKU-11 runs a 4–100 kB battery-health model beside four hardwired protection trips.
Every figure on this page is a design target unless marked otherwise.
- Protection
- 4 hardwired trips: over-voltage, under-voltage, over-current, over-temperature
- State of health
- On-chip AI accelerator; 4–100 kB model; optional EIS
- Platform
- DG32-Max host, CAN-FD, crypto, root of trust
SKU-11 runs a 4–100 kB battery-health model beside four hardwired protection trips.
SKU-11 brings control, battery-health estimation and authentication together. The cell-measuring and isolation components remain external.
- Job
- Run a lithium battery pack safely and estimate its state of health on the chip.
- Replaces
- The MCU beside a TI BQ769xx or ADI ADBMS front end, the separate neural accelerator for state-of-health inference, and the authentication chip: three parts become one.
- Status
- Block specification issued September 2026; no wafer-run slot assigned yet.
The business case for SKU-11
The adoption decision depends on the measurement partner and battery data, as well as the controller itself.
What it replaces
The MCU beside a TI BQ769xx or ADI ADBMS front end, the separate neural accelerator for state-of-health inference, and the authentication chip: three parts become one.
Customer opportunity
Lead tier: centralised e-2W and e-3W packs on a single front end. Second tier: master controller for cars, buses and grid storage, with the isoSPI bridge switched in.
Policy and demand
AIS-156 has required a microprocessor-based BMS on every L-category EV since December 2022, and its thermal-propagation test makes protection safety-critical. The EU Battery Passport, mandatory from 18 February 2027, requires state-of-health data for batteries over 2 kWh sold in the EU.
The delivery trade-off
The cell front end stays bought. At 130 nm the protection comparators, ported from SKU-6, and the DG32-Max platform share a die, and a 4–100 kB model needs its own memory, not a smaller node. A 1 kbit ReRAM macro holds the keys, rollback counter and the hash chain that makes the battery log tamper-evident.
What SKU-11 claims, what it is worth, and what gates it.
The following mechanisms explain the proposed customer benefit. Each still needs to be validated in the complete product.
SKU-11 runs a 4–100 kB battery-health model beside four hardwired protection trips.
SKU-11 brings control, battery-health estimation and authentication together. The cell-measuring and isolation components remain external.
Battery health runs on-chip; cell measurement and isolation stay with a partner.
The adoption decision depends on the measurement partner and battery data, as well as the controller itself.
The measurement partner and field battery data are not yet chosen.
The Blueprint leaves the measurement partner and field dataset as key dependencies; no manufacturing shuttle is assigned.
Architecture targets, not datasheet values.
Every figure is a design target stated in the SKU Blueprint, page 40. None is a measurement of manufactured silicon.
- 4–100 kBOn-chip state-of-health model
- 4Hardwired protection trips
- 130 nmShares a die with DG32-Max
Detailed architecture and specifications
- Process
- 130 nm CMOS (SKY130), on the DG32-Max platform die
- Platform
- DG32-Max host, CAN-FD, crypto, root of trust
- State of health
- On-chip AI accelerator; 4–100 kB model; optional EIS
- Protection
- 4 hardwired trips: over-voltage, under-voltage, over-current, over-temperature
- Front end
- Bought cell front end (BQ76952 class) and isolation chip
- Records
- Battery log hash chain anchored in ReRAM
- Process
- 130 nm CMOS (SKY130)
- Maturity
- Architecture scope
- Designed toward
- AIS-156 · EU Battery Passport
- Source
- SKU Blueprint, October 2026, page 40
Standards the architecture is designed toward. No DeepGrid part holds a certification or qualification today.
7 questions SKU-11 has to answer before it can be relied on.
The Blueprint’s design and status notes raise these. Each is a question silicon, test or layout has to answer before SKU-11 can be relied on.
Protection must hold if the processor stops.Physics
Over-voltage, under-voltage, over-current and over-temperature trips are hardwired, outside the software path.
Run a state-of-health model at the pack, not in the cloud.Physics
A 4–100 kB model gets its own memory and accelerator, away from the safety path; 130 nm is enough.
India has no automotive-grade analog fab.Physics
The cell front end stays bought; the chip is the digital controller plus protection, bridged to the front end.
Protection without softwareOpen
Which trips stay hardwired, and how fast do they open the contactors with the processor halted?
Model accuracyOpen
How accurate is state-of-health inference on Indian duty cycles: 45 °C ambients, stop-start use and monsoon humidity?
Front-end partnerOpen
Which cell front end is frozen first, and what does the bridge need from it?
Tamper-evident recordsOpen
How does the ReRAM hash chain keep the battery log trustworthy when the log lives in external flash?
An architecture, with its evidence named.
- Strongest evidence
- Block specification: twenty blocks in six groups, reusing the feature-complete DG32-Max platform RTL.
- Development status
- Block specification issued September 2026; no wafer-run slot assigned yet.
Block specification only; the cell-measuring front end and isolation chip are bought, and no model accuracy on Indian field data is claimed.
How every figure on this site was obtainedThe systems it goes into, and the parts beside it.
Protection that works when the processor stops, the AFE partner, and state-of-health accuracy on Indian duty cycles.
Parts beside it
Read the source behind every figure.
Each document opens inside the site at the cited section; the PDF is the edition of record.
Design files
Bring the socket. We will tell you what SKU-11 has to prove for it.
Send the platform, voltage and power environment, interfaces and qualification needs. The reply names what is architecture, what is evidence and what would have to be tested.